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Question 
Why is women's labour force participation rate low in Egypt and in the Maghreb (Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Algeria)? 
Why do women drop out of the formal and informal labour market in these countries and why are 
they less likely to advance than their male counterparts? 
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1. Summary  
Despite increased educational parity between the genders and declining fertility rates, female 
labour force participation rates in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia remain low and even 
declining. This phenomenon is a shared attribute among Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
countries and has therefore been dubbed by the literature as ‘the MENA gender paradox’. The 
literature covers this topic either through a deep dive in one country or a group of countries to 
understand demographic patterns of participating women and their experiences in the labour 
market, or through a regional perspective, pointing to shared structural, institutional, or cultural 
qualities that result in the low female labour force participation. 
The first branch of literature makes apparent that part of the low participation can be attributed to 
an accounting issue; women are overrepresented in subsistence work, which is hard to capture 
and goes uncounted in most surveys. Beyond that, education and occupation matter; educated 
women constitute a minority in the population but a majority among participating women. The 
public sector is favoured by women, especially married ones with children, because of its 
reconcilability with marital and maternal responsibilities, unlike the private sector.  
Looking at the characteristics of working women in the four countries of interest, it is clear that 
they have a completely different labour market experiences compared to their male counterparts. 
They tend to be concentrated in very few fields, such as education, health, and public 
administration and have extremely high unemployment rates. They also earn significantly less 
than men, in no small part due to pay discrimination, and face widespread sexual harassment. 
Within the second branch of literature, some look to cultural or Islamic values to explain the low 
female labour force participation. This is met with mixed results as well as criticism regarding 
weak conceptualization and reductionism. Instead, other studies delve deeply into the various 
economic, structural, and institutional factors and the interactions between them that caused the 
sustainability of these cultural norms and, consequently, the stagnation in female labour force 
participation. These include factors like dual labour markets that push women into unemployment 
and inactivity, social policies that reinforce a traditional family structure, and the resource curse 
from oil revenues that inhibited the growth of female-dominated fields (the traded sector) and 
maintained a high level of wages that allowed the one breadwinner family to remain affordable.  
2. Defining concepts 
The labour force participation rate is defined as the percentage of the working age population 
who are employed or unemployed. Employed individual comprise those who have a job as paid 
employees or as self-employed. The unemployed are those without work but who are willing and 
available to take up employment and have been actively seeking work. The working age 
population varies in its definition; it is either defined as those aged 15 and over or those who are 
aged between 15 and 64.  
Some problems arise from this measure, especially in its ability to capture certain types of work. 
For example, workers who are involved in irregular, unpaid or subsistence employment are 
sometimes counted among those who are outside the labour force, despite being engaged in work 
(this is generally referred to as informal work). Since most workers who belong to these categories 
are women, this leads to the underestimation of the number of women engaged in work (ILO, n.d.). 
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It can also lead to an inconsistent measure of participation across different sources, countries, and 
time, making it difficult to compare. 
Another flaw in this measure is that it does not capture so-called discouraged workers. These are 
men and women of working age who are not actively seeking employment or who have not found 
employment after long-term unemployment, but who are willing to work. Because these are 
usually individuals who have given up looking for work, they do not count as unemployed but as 
outside the labour force, despite their ability and desire to be engaged in employment.  
Both these issues are relevant to the countries of interest, and to MENA at large. In the case of 
hidden work, the female labour force participation rate tends to be underestimated because of the 
concentration of women in the agricultural sector, where subsistence work is particularly prevalent. 
Additionally, because recent surveys make a specific effort to capture all the different types of 
workers, this may result in old data becoming incomparable to the new, meaning that change over 
time is difficult to capture accurately (World Bank, 2004). For the case of discouraged workers, the 
high female unemployment rate in the region (which will be discussed in coming sections), likely 
means that there are many women who are willing and able to work but have stopped looking for 
a job and are therefore counted as outside the labour force. 
3. Scope of the literature and data 
Because the low female labour force participation rate is a shared attribute among MENA 
countries, some studies on the topic tend to look for an explanation for this phenomenon based 
on commonalities across countries in the region, such as resource abundance, dual labour 
markets, or cultural attitudes. These studies tend to provide a more theoretical and conceptual 
understanding of the issue at hand, delving into shared economic, institutional and social factors 
that gave rise to the MENA gender paradox (which will be explained in the next section) and 
inhibited the growth of the female labour force.  
More recent work, however, tends to take deep dives in one country or a handful of specific 
countries to disentangle patterns pertaining to the characteristics of working and non-working 
women and their experiences within the household and in the labour market. These include 
understanding the relationship between variables such as education, marriage, and geographic 
location on the one hand and female labour force participation on the other as well as analysing 
the experience of women in the labour market in terms of the wages they receive and the sectors 
and industries that they tend to occupy.  
In terms of the scope of the literature, the subject is generally very well covered, especially in the 
cases of Egypt and Tunisia. This is because these two countries have analogous individual- and 
household-level datasets; the Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) and the Tunisian 
Labour Market Panel Survey (TLMPS), both collected by the same institution (the Economic 
Research Forum) and designed to be comparable, representative, and able to capture elusive 
properties, such as informal and subsistence work as well as discouraged workers (Assaad et 
al., 2016; Krafft et al., 2019). Morocco also has some individual- and household-level data that 
allows for a rich exploration but is not comparable and not as extensive as the aforementioned 
surveys. Finally, Algeria has very little data at the micro-level therefore most studies tend to be 
small scale, qualitative, and focus on a specific region or area of the country. 
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4. The MENA gender paradox 
Female labour force participation rate in MENA is one of the lowest in the world, despite gains in 
educational parity between the genders and declining fertility rates, two measures that are strongly 
associated with higher economic activity among women (Assaad et al., 2018). As of 2019, only 
19% of women in MENA participated in the labour force, compared to 25% in South Asia, 58% in 
Latin America, 65% in East Asia and Pacific, 63% in sub-Saharan Africa, and 59% in Europe and 
Central Asia (World Development Indicators, 2020). Unemployment among women (and men) in 
the MENA region is also the highest in the world; the female unemployment rate in 2019 was 
20.1% in MENA compared to 5% in South Asia, 10% in Latin America, 4% in East Asia and Pacific, 
7% in sub-Saharan Africa, and 7% in Europe and Central Asia (WDI, 2020). 
Most of the countries studied in this report have higher-than-average female labour force 
participation in the region; it stands at 24% for Tunisia and 22% for Morocco and Egypt in 2019. 
Algeria stands out as it has lower-than-average participation among countries in the MENA 
region at 15% in 2019. The unemployment rate for women varies across these countries, at 23% 
in Tunisia, 22% in Egypt, 21% in Algeria, and only 10% in Morocco (WDI, 2020).  
As mentioned, aggregate measures of female labour force participation fail to capture some 
types of ‘hidden’ work. For the case of Egypt and the three Maghreb countries, surveys that 
attempt to capture this hidden work find mixed results. For example, when an extended definition 
of employment is used (capturing subsistence especially in the agricultural sector), the 
employment rate of women in Tunisia nearly doubles (Hanmer et al., 2017). Similarly, using the 
extended definition takes the female labour force participation rate in Egypt from 23% to 34% 
(Hendy, 2015). Specific numbers for Morocco and Algeria are harder to come by because of data 
availability, but the literature indicates a similar picture (Bellache et al., 2020; Najjar et al., 2018); 
the concentration of women in the agricultural sector means that their participation is 
underestimated. 
While female labour force participation does increase substantially when hidden work is 
accounted for, it is important to note that it is still low, especially when compared to regions at a 
similar level of economic development; the average female labour force participation rate in 
middle income countries stands at 49% (WDI, 2020). The reasons for this low participation 
despite gains in education for women and declining fertility rates will be discussed in the next 
section.  
5. Women’s labour force participation 
The decision of an individual woman on whether to take part in economic activities is highly 
intertwined with her demographic characteristics. For example, women worldwide who are young 
and educated are more likely to take part in paid work. Married women with children, however, 
are less likely to engage in economic activities. The relationship also goes the other way; for 
example, women who are educated are more likely to work, marry late, and have fewer children. 
On the other hand, women who have less propensity to work may chose not to go into further 
education. Disentangling these relationships are useful because it facilitates the understanding of 





Education and participation in the labour force for women are generally positively linked. In 
mainstream economic theory, the reason behind that is that women with higher education can 
have access to higher wages in the labour market, which acts as a pull-factor towards 
participation. Another reason for this positive relationship is that women with higher education 
are more likely to have access to jobs with desirable working conditions which makes work 
easier to consolidate with their perceived role as homemaker and meet their reservation working 
conditions (Assaad & Krafft, 2016; Dougherty, 2014). Finally, education can also help women 
break through traditional gender roles and give them more autonomy and independence. 
Recently, however, more complex theories have emerged to better describe this link, especially 
in the case of developing countries. One of the most prevalent is the U-shaped relationship 
between women’s education and participation; it postulates that women who are the least and 
the most educated participate in the labour force, the first group out of necessity and the second 
because of opportunity (Klasen & Pieters, 2012). 
In the case of Egypt and the three Maghreb countries, the single most important determinant of 
participation among women is the level education, as long as the education is at the post-
secondary level or higher. As Spierings et al (2008) show, there is a huge difference in the 
participation rates of women with secondary education and women with any type of tertiary 
education. The strength of this relationship is confirmed through several other studies on these 
four countries (Belkaid, 2019; Ben Mouelhi & Goaied, 2017; Hendy, 2015; Verme et al., 2016). 
Despite the fact that women with tertiary education remain a minority in the population, they 
constitute the majority of the labour force because of their high participation rates (Spierings et 
al., 2008) 
Despite the strength of this relationship, rising educational attainment has not led to higher 
female labour force participation at the country level (Assaad et al., 2018). The reason behind 
this is the deteriorating job opportunities in the public sector in Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt 
without a compensatory, meaningful increase in private sector employment. Since women select 
themselves into public sector employment because of its shorter hours and generous maternity 
and family leave policies, the curtailment of government jobs has meant that more educated 
women are either dropping out of the labour force (in case of Algeria), becoming unemployed (in 
the case of Tunisia), or a combination of both (in the case of Egypt) (Assaad et al., 2018). There 
is no discussion in the literature on why women with secondary education or lower – who 
constitute the majority of inactive women – have such low labour force participation rates. 
Marriage and children 
Marriage and the presence of children are generally negatively correlated with female labour 
force participation. In the case of marriage, the negative relationship is due to the consolidation 
of the gender division of labour in the household as well as the ‘income effect’ that arises from 
having another source of income through a husband’s wage. It can also be a result of so-called 
status ceiling, whereby women drop out of the labour force if they have higher potential earnings 
than their husbands in order to prevent status tension (Spierings et al., 2008). The presence of 
children has a negative effect on women’s work because of care duties; this will vary across 
countries depending on laws and regulations around maternity and childcare.   
Across all four countries, marriage is one of the most important deterrents to participation. In 
Egypt, only 18% of married women are employed, compared to 25% of their unmarried 
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counterparts (Nazier & Ramadan, 2016). The difference is even more extreme in Tunisia, 
whereby 18% of married women are employed compared to 34% of their unmarried counterparts 
(Ben Mouelhi & Goaied, 2017). For Morocco, single women aged 30-49 have a participation rate 
of around 45%, whereas the rate is 28% for their married counterparts. A similar pattern is 
observed for those aged 15-29 (but the reverse is true for those aged 50+) (Verme et al., 2016). 
Unsurprisingly, and similar to patterns observed worldwide, the presence of children in the 
household inhibits women from working across the four countries (Assaad, 2017; Belkaid, 2019; 
Spierings et al., 2008; Verme et al., 2016).  
The effect of marriage and the presence of children not only affects the likelihood of work but 
also the type of jobs that women undertake. Additionally, as mentioned, both marriage and 
children are ‘endogenous’ to each other and to participation i.e. the decision on whether to marry 
and have children or not will also depend on women’s labour market status. Accounting for that, 
Assaad et al (2017) find that women in Egypt and Tunisia who marry by the median age of 
marriage are less likely to take up waged work, mainly due to reduction in the probability of 
taking up private sector jobs. This means that, while curtailment in public sector hiring pushed 
men into the private informal sector, it mostly materialized as unemployment or inactivity for 
women, especially married ones. Assaad and Zouari (2003) also find that non-wage work and 
public sector work in Morocco are more compatible than the private sector with childcare 
responsibilities. 
Interestingly, Assaad and Zouari (2003) also find that marriage on its own does not significantly 
decrease women’s participation for the case of Morocco, but it is the presence of children that 
usually come with marriage that reduce women’s economic activities. It is unclear whether that is 
also true for Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. A counter example is the findings of Ilkkaracan (2012) 
on Turkey, which shows that the effect of marriage on participation is much more pronounced 
than the effect of children on participation, concluding that the ‘institutionalized’ gender roles play 
a more important role in women’s decision to participate than the logistics of childcare.  
Geographic location 
There are substantial differences when it comes to women’s labour market experience across 
geographic locations. In Egypt, women living in rural areas seem to have lower participation rates 
when looking at the market definition of participation. However, when the definition of 
participation is extended to include subsistence work, female labour force participation in rural 
areas shoots up to 39%, compared to 23% in urban areas (Hendy, 2015). This is not surprising, 
given the prevalence of subsistence agrarian activities in rural areas.  
Tunisia shows a similar pattern, where using an extended definition of labour force participation 
pushes rural women’s employment to a much higher rate, exceeding that of their urban 
counterparts (Hanmer et al., 2017). There is also extremely high unemployment rate among 
educated Tunisian women living in rural areas; this is attributed to smaller networks, limited 
opportunities, and lack of transport links to facilitate mobility to urban areas (Ben Mouelhi & 
Goaied, 2017). 
For Morocco, Verme et al. (2016) find that, while both urban and rural female labour force 
participation have been declining over time, rural rates are consistently higher than urban rates. 
Interestingly, they also find that marriage only reduces the likelihood to work for women living in 
urban areas, but it has no effect on rural areas. This is likely the case because agrarian work is 
more compatible with childrearing and domestic responsibilities.  
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For Algeria, women are more likely to participate if they live in urban areas, in contrast with the 
other three countries (Belkaid, 2019; Lassassi & Tansel, 2020).  
6. Women’s labour market experiences  
Type of work and gender occupational segregation  
Access to different types of work, similar to participation, is also determined by educational 
attainment. According to Assaad et al. (2018), less educated women have limited access to 
wage work in general, and tend to be concentrated in unpaid work, subsistence work or self-
employment. Educated women can access waged labour, gravitating towards the public sector 
especially if they are married. Single women engage in private sector wage work but tend to drop 
out upon marriage. Women’s concentration in public sector work stems from its reconcilability 
with family responsibility, unlike private sector work, which is demanding and offers undesirable 
working conditions especially in the informal sector (Assaad et al., 2018; Hendy, 2015).  
As a result, with the recent decline in the number of public sector opportunities in the region, 
women are finding themselves increasingly unable to find desirable working opportunities. This 
has translated to a higher unemployment rate that is especially prevalent among educated 
women, wavering around 30% for all four countries (WDI, 2020). According to Assaad (2017), 
this indicates that there is a desire among them to engage in work, as long as they find a suitable 
job that meets the working conditions that they find acceptable, which the private sector does not 
offer. There is not much discussion, however, on why less educated women do not engage in 
paid work, despite forming the ‘backbone’ of the female labour force in other developing 
countries (Chamlou et al., 2016; Klasen & Pieters, 2012). 
Women occupy a limited number of fields that are traditionally female dominated including 
agricultural activities, education, human health, public administration and light manufacturing 
(especially textiles) (Ben Mouelhi & Goaied, 2017; Nazier & Ramadan, 2016; Verme et al., 2016). 
It is unclear to what extent this gender occupational segregation is due to discrimination, choice, 
or a combination of both. Generally, however, this may be another reason for high 
unemployment rates among women, as they crowd-out the few options that they have and 
limiting the number of working opportunities that they can undertake (Bergmann, 1971), 
potentially having a ‘feedback loop’ effect on their participation rates. 
Gender wage gap and sexual harassment in the workplace 
Women in these countries also earn less than their male counterparts, even after controlling for 
differences in characteristics. In Egypt, for example, Nazier (2017) finds that there is a large 
gender wage gap especially at the lower and upper end of the wage distribution, indicating a 
wage ceiling for women as well as a sticky floor. For Tunisia, Jeddi and Malouche (2015) 
estimates the gender wage gap to be about 19%, most of it is attributed to discrimination due to a 
lower return on experience for women when compared to men. A study conducted in Sais, 
Morocco (Najjar et al., 2018) on the agricultural sector shows a clear gender wage gap resulting 
from discrimination, with women getting paid less than men for the same tasks. Finally, in 
Algeria, a study conducted on the Kabylia region finds a gender wage gap (unadjusted for 
differences in characteristics) both in the formal and informal sector (Bellache et al., 2020). 
Because educated women in these countries participate in the labour market at a 
disproportionate rate whereas men of all educational backgrounds work, the female labour force 
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tends to be more educated than the male labour force. This means that a gender wage gap that 
is unadjusted for characteristics is likely ‘hiding’ higher wage discrimination.  
Women face widespread sexual harassment at work across occupations. According to Hersch 
(2015), only Morocco and Algeria have laws against workplace sexual harassment, in contrast 
with the rest of the MENA countries. Despite that, there are still reports of concern surrounding 
incidences of sexual harassment in Morocco, namely in the agricultural sector; according to 
Najjar et al (2018), women have to restrict their work options to small, family-owned farms and 
prefer to work in women only groups to avoid being harassed by male co-workers and 
supervisors. Egyptian women in the nursing sector report a similar story; a study on female 
nurses reveals that more than half of them have faced some form of sexual harassment, that it 
decreases their job satisfaction, and makes them more likely to drop out of work (Maghraby et 
al., 2020). 
7. Cultural, institutional, and structural factors 
Islam and the MENA culture 
While demographic characteristics and labour market experiences give insights on patterns and 
characteristics of female labour force participation in the North African countries of interest, they 
are unable to explain why participation is so low. One reason explored by the literature is cultural 
or social norms, derived from Islam or otherwise, that inhibit women from taking part in economic 
activities and stops them reaping the fruits of socioeconomic improvement. These studies tend to 
be pan-MENA and focus to varying degrees on the four countries of interest.  
Caris and Hayo (2012) explore the role of Islam and cultural traditions in female labour force 
participation across various countries including Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco. They find that 
women with traditional values regarding women’s role in the household are much less likely to 
take part in the labour force than their less traditional counterparts. Similarly, Chamlou et al 
(2016), looking at Cairo, find that women who live in households where traditional views on 
gender roles are held are less likely to participate in paid employment.  
Bayanpourtehrani and Sylwester (2013) attempt to quantify the effect of a country’s dominant 
religion on its female labour force participation rate. They deploy a cross-country analysis and 
find that the coefficient on the percentage of Muslims in a country significantly affects female 
labour force participation rates until the MENA region is accounted for, in which case the Muslim 
coefficient becomes similar to that of Catholicism and Hinduism. This implies that the MENA 
region is driving the negative results of the Muslim coefficient, meaning that non-MENA Muslim-
majority countries (e.g. Indonesia) do not necessarily have lower female labour force 
participation rates than Catholic majority or Hindu majority countries. They conclude that there 
are some unique aspects to the MENA region – not Islam – that dampen participation. The paper 
does not elaborate further on where this uniqueness comes from, however. 
These arguments do not explain why these cultural factors persist or why they remain ‘affordable’ 
in the MENA region, whereas they had to change elsewhere. For example, Western Europe 
witnessed transformation of the patriarchal family structure only post World War II for various 
demographic and structural reasons (Boustati, 2020; Karshenas, 1997). Therefore, other work in 
the literature introduces institutional and structural economic factors to explain the persistence of 
the patriarchal family and, consequently, the low female labour force participation.  
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Dual labour markets and the resource curse  
Assaad (2014) explains the low female labour force participation through invoking the dual labour 
market divided into a bloated public sector and an anaemic private sector. The authoritarian 
bargaining social contract is characteristic of most MENA regimes whereby politically significant 
groups are provided with well-compensated jobs in the public sector in exchange for 
relinquishing their political rights. This puts pressure on fiscal budgets but is sustainable due to 
access to resource rents as well as foreign aid, but the result is the undermining of the labour 
markets’ function of efficient allocation of human capital.  
When oil prices fell, the regimes were able to maintain their power by protecting the gains of 
insiders and shifting the cost of adjustment to outsiders – in this case the younger generation and 
women. As rates of public employment declined, so did women’s, leading to higher 
unemployment rates and then a decrease in the overall participation since the private sector was 
not a viable alternative. This is especially relevant for the case of Egypt, where such patterns are 
indeed observed. 
Ross (2008), on the other hand, proposes that revenue from oil is the reason behind the low 
female labour force participation rate in the MENA region. It created a pattern of growth whereby 
job creation was concentrated in non-exporting sectors that are capital intensive and generally 
favour male labour. This came at the expense of growth in exporting sectors that are labour 
intensive and favour female labour, such as light manufacturing. This resulted in limited demand 
for female labour, inhibiting the growth in women’s participation rate. While some MENA 
countries are not oil rich, their fates are to some degree still tied to oil prices because of their 
interconnectedness with oil rich states; this includes remittances from migrants living in Gulf 
countries as well as the substantial aid flows from resource rich countries to resource poor 
countries, This, in effect, created a similar pattern of capital intensive growth in some resource 
poor MENA countries. In the case of the four North Africa countries of interest, this may explain 
why Algeria has lower participation than Morocco and Tunisia.  
Mogahdam (2005) explores the effect of structural policy on female labour force participation in 
MENA with a focus on social policy. The oil boom era between the 1960s and 1980s was 
characterised with investments in women’s education as well as the establishment of labour laws 
and regulations, such as maternity leaves and workplace nurseries, to allow women to take part 
in the workforce. Despite that, the nature of state investments at the time and the types of 
industries in place meant limited demand for female labour.  
With the oil price crash in the late 1980s and the consequent restructuring, many countries in the 
region failed to transition into export-led growth, a model of development that is characterised by 
labour-intensive industries that relies on female workers. Because it was a time of recession and 
high unemployment, some countries in the region followed implicit strategies (such as early 
retirement and bridal end-of-term bonuses) to exclude women from the work force and prioritise 
male employment (Moghadam, 1998). This inevitably resulted in perpetuating a cultural 
understanding of gender roles within a “patriarchal gender contract” (Moghadam, 2005) that sees 
the man as responsible for the economic well-being of the family. 
Moghadam (2005) also compares Tunisia’s structural and social policies to that of Jordan and 
Iran on the other. Tunisia was more successful than the other two countries in transitioning 
towards exporting, subsequently increasing female employment in the manufacturing sector. The 
Tunisian state also put in place proactive, progressive policies that allowed Tunisian women 
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rights that were far more advanced than in other MENA countries, including instating support for 
working women and divorced mothers, establishing research institutes that focus on gender 
issues, and amending the constitution to include non-discrimination principles. The combination 
of a successful transition towards exportation and a state that is willing to promote women’s 
rights resulted in Tunisia being hailed as the exception, having higher female labour force 
participation rates and generally better outcomes for women than most other states in MENA.    
Finally, Karshenas (1997) argues that revenue from natural resources (in terms of rents and 
remittances) in MENA allowed wages to remain when compared to other regions, especially in 
the manufacturing sector. This meant that having only one breadwinner in the family remained 
‘affordable’, so there was no incentive for women to take up the position of secondary wage 
earners. As a result, the MENA region trapped itself into a particular family structure which does 
not correspond to their development stage or to their production capacity. Therefore, during 
important stages in their economic development trajectories, when gender roles could have been 
redefined, and culture could take a backseat to economic development, there was no incentive 
for women in MENA to join the labour force in large numbers.   
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